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JF LORD ACTON and Mr. Justice Stone ever talked together, on this 
earth of ours or along the celestial shore, the records present no 
account of it. The shops in which they did their distinctive work lay 
far apart, and the craft of the one was no concern of the other. The 
member of the English gentry was a superb historian; he was skilled 
in reciting the course of human events and blessed with an uncanny gift 
of laying bare its meaning. The Yankee from the rocky fields of Massa-
chusetts by way of the teaching of law became a jurist. His trade was 
in controversies between human beings, ordinary and extraordinary, 
arising out of the grand and petty affairs of life. His natural gift was 
to suspend judgment until every relevant fact had fallen into place and 
the alternatives upon which decision rested had been clearly stated. Each 
in his own distinctive way distilled years of experience into the values 
which shaped judgment. Each in the fullness of time came to recognize 
"power" as an unruly thing which in a civilized community had to be 
tamed to the common good. 
The problem of antitrust is a problem of the use of power. Over the 
centuries and out of long experience competition has come to be recog-
nized as offering the best over-all design for the industrial system. The 
general aim of public policy has come to be the imposition of the com-
petitive pattern upon economic activity and the correction of departures 
from it. Like others of its kind, this general policy has not been self-
enforcing. The instrument alike of imposition and of correction has come 
to be an appeal to the courts. But the techniques, procedures, devices, and 
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rules through which public control becomes antitrust in action were 
never contrived to instrument so general a mandate. If the courts are 
to effect a return of errant industries to the competitive design, these 
blunt instruments, intended to serve other uses, must be bent to an 
alien task. They present hazards and problems which may even deflect 
the resort to law from its proper objective. The ordinary judge is far 
more at home with a controversy between private parties than in em-
ploying the judicial process to make effective public policy. He is likely 
to be far more sensitive to the dictates of precedents and procedures 
than to the departures of business from the channels into which it is 
intended to run. Matters of significance in private suits may be mean-
ingless or even misleading in antitrust cases. 
In substance, questions of policy are matters of political economy. 
In the court they go forward dressed up as law suits between adverse 
parties. The result is an ever-present temptation to confusion to which 
judges and attorneys must constantly be alerted. In private law "intent" 
may rank high in the equation of decision; the state of mind of the 
actor often determines whether the accused act is lawful or unlawful. 
In antitrust the harm resulting from a conspiracy in restraint of trade 
is the same whether the p~rsons acting in concert have intended only 
their own advantage or move to the disadvantage of their victims. If 
the major companies in an industry gang up, it is of no consolation to 
the independent who is put out of business that they acted in "good 
faith." If a single concern comes to dominate a strategic industry the 
impact upon the economy and upon the fortunes of individuals is the 
same whether the effect is due to "natural growth" or results from a 
calculated course of conduct. It may be that in terms of "legal law" size 
is of no consequence; that it is the quality of the act which counts. But 
common sense tells us a tiger cannot replace a cat as a household pet, even 
if the feline character of the two beasts is identical. An antitrust pro-
ceeding is not punitive in nature. It is not the conduct of persons, cor-
porate or incorporate, which are being assessed. It is rather the revision 
of a domain of the economy which for the sake of a common good is being 
reorganized. A case at law ·goes astray if it is not recognized that a 
concern with the behavior of individuals does no more than supply the 
forms within which a segment of industry is being put in order. AU of 
this was clearly recognized by Mr. Justice Stone, who never confused the 
legal instrument with the public policy it was intended to serve. The 
keyword of _his antitrust opinions is "power," and his concern with 
probing the maze of legal issues is always the existence and use of this 
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power. A classic case in which he spoke for the United States Supreme 
Court is United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.1 In this case he did not, 
as so often he is represented, assume the role of Sir Oracle and pontifi-
cate as from Olympus that price-fixing is per se illegal. Instead, he 
set down a rationale which is now elementary in antitrust law. A com-
bination of the major companies in an industrial area has the power to 
fix prices. The power to fix prices comprehends the power to fix un-
reasonable as well as reasonable prices. The courts do not possess the 
facilities with which to determine whether prices thus arbitrarily fixed 
are reasonable or unreasonable. If, therefore, the public is to be saved 
from having to pay unreasonable prices, the power to fix prices must 
itself be abated. The alternative is to convert the antitrust mandate into 
high-sounding and empty rhetoric. Thus, the per se rule, instead of 
being an arbitrary imperative, is an expression of sense and reason. 
In this spirit, the editors of the GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL have 
inspired, promoted, and published the collection of articles which follows. 
They have refused to accept any mandate of antitrust as a dictum. They 
have, in an endeavor which has covered months and involved a pains-
taking exploration of many lines of inquiry, been guided by the precept 
of St. Paul, "Prove all things; hold fast to that which is good." Although 
the articles here brought together come from authors whose experiences 
have been different and who have diverse views, this Symposium makes 
one thing clear. It probes to fundamentals and finds the control of 
"power" to be the basic antitrust problem. As Mr. Justice Stone, in a 
series of opinions, has clearly recognized, there is in a democracy no place 
for the exercise of irresponsible power. Where it exists it must be broken 
up or directed to the public good. Those who have power must, in the 
words of the Constitution, "have to answer in another place" for their 
acts. If there is no other place in which to answer, the power itself must 
be denied. For, as Lord Acton has put it, "Power tends to corrupt; 
absolute power corrupts absolutely." In this common stance of a great 
English historian and a great American jurist lies the key to all that is 
called antitrust. 
1 237 u.s. 392 (1927). 
